NOTE
The Right to Publicity After Death: Postmortem
Personality Rights in Washington in the Wake of
Experience Hendrix v. HendrixLicensing.com
Aubrie Hicks∗
“It’s funny how most people love the dead. Once you’re dead,
you’re made for life.”1

I. INTRODUCTION
People have always been fascinated by fame. Many are drawn to
celebrities, and more importantly, the money that often comes along with
fame.2 Celebrities often come from humble beginnings and work for
many years before they attain any level of notoriety or earn any significant income. Accordingly, as the level of celebrity (and wealth) increases, so does the need for protection.
Celebrities and their capacity to earn money from their likeness are
protected under the right of publicity or personality. The right of publicity or personality refers to “the inherent right of every human being to
control the commercial use of his or her identity.”3 As there is no federally protected right of publicity, each state has created its own protections
for this intellectual property right.4 Generally, the right of publicity pro∗ J.D. Candidate, Seattle University School of Law, 2013; B.A., English, Weber State University,
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1. Jimi Hendrix; see JERRY HOPKINS, THE JIMI HENDRIX EXPERIENCE 9 (1993).
2. See Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity
Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127, 148−49 (1993).
3. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:3 (2d ed. 2011).
4. Id.

275

276

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 36:275

vides celebrities with legal protection in the form of a tort action, and
allows them to retain control over the commercial use of their identity or
persona.5 Under right of publicity doctrines, celebrities can bring an unfair competition claim against any individual who infringes this important intellectual property right.6
While the states are fairly consistent in protecting the rights of living individuals, the level of protection for deceased celebrities varies
among the states.7 Some states allow the right to extend beyond death,
while others refuse to recognize a postmortem right of publicity.8 Even
among states that do recognize a postmortem right of publicity, the right
is protected to varying degrees, with some states providing explicit statutory protections and others providing only common law protections.9
Given the inconsistencies among the states, the continuing right to
publicity after death has been the subject of much litigation over the last
few years, especially in light of the fact that many celebrities continue to
earn vast amounts of money even after death.10 The most notable cases
involve well-known celebrities such as Marilyn Monroe, Elvis Presley,
and Jimi Hendrix.11 In each case, the court refused to extend the right of
publicity past death, denying intellectual property protections to each
celebrity’s estate.12
5. Id. § 1:3. “Persona” includes names, nicknames, voice, pictures, and performing style. Id. §
4:46.
6. Id. § 1:3; see also White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1398 (9th Cir. 1992).
7. John W. Branch, David H. Green & Karl A. Hefter, No Respect for the Dead: Protecting
Deceased Celebrity Personality Rights, 76 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. 678 (2008); see also
Herman Miller, Inc. v. Palazzetti Imps. & Exps., Inc., 270 F.3d 298, 326 nn.12−14 (6th Cir. 2001)
(noting that sixteen states recognize a postmortem right of publicity under statute or common law,
while two states explicitly refuse to recognize a postmortem right of publicity).
8. See Herman Miller, Inc., 270 F.3d at 326 nn.12−14.
9. See id.
10. See Kathy Heller, Deciding Who Cashes in on the Deceased Celebrity Business, 11 CHAP.
L. REV. 545, 545 (2008) (“According to the annual list published by Forbes.com, the thirteen ‘Top
Earning Dead Celebrities’ grossed a combined total of $232 million in twelve months ending October, 2007. The Forbes list is topped by the estate of Elvis Presley, which generated $49 million, and
includes familiar names like Albert Einstein and John Lennon, as well as relative newcomers, such
as the rapper, Tupac Shakur, and the ‘Godfather of Soul,’ James Brown. According to industry estimates, ‘after Mr. Presley, Ms. Monroe and James Dean are the most valuable dead-celebrity
brands.’”).
11. See, e.g., Memphis Dev. Found. v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980); Experience Hendrix, L.L.C. v. Elec. Hendrix, L.L.C., No. C07-0338 TSZ, 2008 WL 3243896 (W.D. Wash.
Aug. 7, 2008); Shaw Family Archives, Ltd. v. CMG Worldwide, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 2d 309
(S.D.N.Y. 2007).
12. See Memphis Dev. Found., 616 F.2d at 959 (“[H]eretofore, the law has always thought that
leaving a good name to one’s children is sufficient reward in itself for the individual, famous or not.
Commercialization of this virtue after death in the hands of heirs is contrary to our legal tradition
and somehow seems contrary to the moral presuppositions of our culture.”); Shaw Family Archives,
486 F. Supp. 2d at 314 (“Thus, at the time of her death in 1962 Ms. Monroe did not have any post-
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Notably, litigation involving Jimi Hendrix’s personality rights led
to the 2008 passage of the Washington Personality Rights Act (WPRA),
which expanded the existing personality rights statutes to ensure that the
rights were protected after death.13 As a result, Washington State was
regarded as having the strongest statutory protection of personality rights
for deceased individuals.14 But in February 2011, the District Court for
the Western District of Washington held that the amendments to the
Washington Personality Rights Act were unconstitutional.15 In his opinion, Judge Thomas S. Zilly reasoned that the WPRA violated the Due
Process, Full Faith and Credit, and dormant Commerce Clauses of the
U.S. Constitution.16
This Comment explores the development of publicity rights and
states’ methods of protecting, or their failure to protect, the rights of deceased celebrities. Part II provides background on celebrity rights in the
United States and examines the evolution of rights in Washington State.
Part III examines the district court’s decision in Experience Hendrix,
L.L.C., v. HendrixLicensing.com, Ltd.17 Part IV offers suggestions for
ways in which the Personality Rights Act can be amended to ensure the
continuation of publicity rights after death without violating the Constitution. Part V provides a summary and conclusion.

II. BACKGROUND: THE RIGHT TO PUBLICITY
The right of publicity ensures that an individual has the right to
control the commercial exploitation of his or her name, picture, and likeness in connection with the sale, advertisement, or solicitation of products and merchandise.18 Courts originally recognized only a general
common law right of privacy, which was extended to cover the use of a
person’s identity.19 In 1953, Judge Jerome Frank introduced the idea of a
“right of publicity” in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum,
Inc.20 By 2000, many states had provided statutory protections for the
right of publicity.21
mortem right of publicity under the law of any relevant state. As a result, any publicity rights she
enjoyed during her lifetime were extinguished at her death by operation of law.”).
13. See H.B. Rep. 2727, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008).
14. Branch, Green, & Hefter, supra note 7, at 1.
15. Experience Hendrix, L.L.C., v. HendrixLicensing.com, Ltd., 766 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1140,
1142 (W.D. Wash. 2011).
16. Experience Hendrix, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1140, 1142.
17. Id. at 1122.
18. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 1:3.
19. Id. § 1:4.
20. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953)
(“This right might be called a ‘right of publicity.’ For it is common knowledge that many prominent
persons (especially actors and ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised through public
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A. Discrepancies in Right of Publicity Protections Among the States
Eleven states provide only a common law right of publicity, including Alabama, Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Hawaii, Maine, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Oregon, and South Carolina.22 Nineteen other states have enacted statutory measures to further protect the
right of publicity, most notably Washington, California, Tennessee, and
Indiana.23 These states are notable because the statutory measures were
enacted mostly for the protection of celebrities who live or lived in each
state. For example, California’s publicity rights statute was enacted because “California has an overriding interest in safeguarding its citizens
from the diminution in value of their names and likenesses, enhanced by
California’s status as the center of the entertainment industry.”24 Similarly, Tennessee enacted its Personal Rights Protection Act of 1984 in response to litigation surrounding the estate of Elvis Presley.25
Even among the states providing statutory protections, there is
much variation in these laws. Some statutes were created in response to
specific cases in which courts refused to recognize a right of publicity or
privacy.26 Others were created “because other states had recently done so
and it seemed the sensible thing to do.”27 Some statutes protect only a
person’s name or likeness28 while others offer protection for a person’s
name, likeness, photograph, and voice.29
One of the main differences in each state’s statutory approach is the
way in which the state protects (or declines to protect) postmortem publicity rights. For example, California and Illinois both provide express
postmortem statutory rights. While California offers protection for 70

exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses,
trains and subways. This right of publicity would usually yield them no money unless it could be
made the subject of an exclusive grant which barred any other advertiser from using their pictures.”);
see also MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 1:4.
21. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 1:4.
22. Brittany A. Adkins, Comment, Crying out for Uniformity: Eliminating State Inconsistencies in Right of Publicity Protection Through a Uniform Right of Publicity Act, 40 CUMB. L. REV.
499, 501 (2010).
23. Id.
24. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 6:22 (quoting Sinatra v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 854 F.2d 1191,
1202 (9th Cir. 1988).
25. Id. § 6:16.
26. Id. § 6:6.
27. Id.
28. These states include, for example, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Kentucky. MCCARTHY,
supra note 3, § 6:8.
29. Examples of states offering at least one of these additional protections include California,
Indiana, and Nevada. Id.
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years after death, Illinois protects these rights for only 50 years.30 In contrast, states like Massachusetts and Rhode Island do not provide any explicit protection for postmortem rights in their statutes.31
The conflicting treatment of postmortem publicity rights is due
largely to the way each state views the right to publicity. Some states
treat the right as a property right while others treat the right as a privacy
right. As such, the differences in privacy laws and property laws lead to
different outcomes in each state.
1. Personality as a Privacy Right
The concept of a “right of publicity” has its origins in privacy law.32
Although the concept of privacy can have many different meanings, for
the purposes of understanding rights of publicity, the following definition
articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court applies:
[B]oth the common law and the literal understandings of privacy
encompass the individual’s control of information concerning his or
her person. In an organized society, there are few facts that are not
at one time or another divulged to another. Thus the extent of the
protection accorded a privacy right at common law rested in part on
the degree of dissemination of the allegedly private fact and the extent to which the passage of time rendered it private.33

The Supreme Court uses a broad definition of privacy, encompassing the
right to control the use of information about one’s private self.34 This
broad definition is especially important to celebrities because they stand
to lose or gain income depending on the level of control they have over
their publicity rights.35
Courts have historically focused on the “indignity or mental trauma” associated with the nonpermissive commercial use of someone’s
identity.36 Many well-known celebrities brought suit for damages they
suffered from the commercial use of their identity; however, these were
usually monetary rather than psychological damages.37 Thus, the right of
publicity developed into a commercial tort under unfair competition
law.38 Several states (such as New York, Utah, and Wisconsin) classify
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. § 1:7.
33. Id. § 1:6 (quoting U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Comm. For Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749, 751 (1989)).
34. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 1:6.
35. See generally Madow, supra note 2.
36. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 1:7.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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the right of publicity as a privacy right.39 As such, the right is entirely
personal and cannot survive after the individual dies.40 It belongs only to
a living person and cannot be transferred to heirs.41
In other states (such as Washington and Indiana), the right of publicity is recognized as a property right that encompasses the same rights
and attributes as tangible property.42
2. Personality as a Property Right
Like personal property, the personality right “can be possessed and
controlled to the exclusion of others. Its economic benefits can be realized and enjoyed. It can also be the subject of a contract and can be assigned to others.”43 As such, the right does not terminate at an individual’s death and can be transferred to others, including heirs and entities.44
Among states that recognize the right of publicity as a property
right, most find jurisdiction in the celebrity’s domicile. This is due to the
fact that courts have held that the economic harm that a celebrity suffers
from the unauthorized use of his identity occurs in the state where the
celebrity lives and where he or she headquarters his or her business.45
Furthermore, the accepted means for managing the estate of a deceased
individual is his or her domicile.46 Thus, when determining whether the
right of publicity is included in the estate of a deceased celebrity, the traditional rule is to look to the law of the state where the individual is domiciled at the time of death.47 Courts generally apply the law of the state in
which the individual was domiciled to the entire estate to avoid creating
conflicts by applying different states’ laws to each piece of property located in that state.48 Establishing the domicile lends uniformity to questions of property law.49 The question of property distribution after death
is determined by the location of the property at issue.50 As the “property”
39. Id. § 6:8.
40. Alain J. Lapter, How the Other Half Lives (Revisited): Twenty Years Since Midler v. Ford
A Global Perspective on the Right of Publicity, 15 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 239, 270 (2007).
41. Robert C. Cumbow, Protecting Your Image: Questioning Publicity Rights Law, WORLD
TRADEMARK REV. Aug.–Sept. 2011, at 84.
42. State ex rel. Elvis Presley Int’l Mem’l Found. v. Cromwell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 97 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1987).
43. Id.
44. Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity: Commercial Exploitation of the Associative
Value of Personality, 39 VAND. L. REV. 1199, 1227 (1986).
45. MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11:16.
46. Id. § 11:17.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Melinda R. Eades, Note, Choice of Law and the Right of Publicity: Domicile as an Essential First Step, 66 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1301, 1309 (2001).
50. Id.
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at issue in a publicity rights case is the persona of the celebrity or individual, it is important to determine where the person was domiciled at
the time of death.51 This becomes especially important in cases like those
involving Jimi Hendrix where a celebrity’s estate establishes domicile in
one state, even though the celebrity was born in and lived in another
state, and the celebrity died in a third state.52
B. Development of the Right of Publicity in Washington State
In 1998, the Washington State Legislature enacted the Personality
Rights Act (the Act). The Act established a statutory basis for each person’s right to the use of his name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness.53 The right was not limited to celebrities, but was established for
each person, whether or not their identity was used commercially during
their lifetime.54 The right was defined as a property right that is exclusive
to the person during their lifetime and does not expire when they die.55
The Act allowed the personality right to be transferred in a will or
“by the laws of intestate succession.”56 The Act also provided that the
right existed for a period of 75 years after death for a person whose identity has commercial value, or a personality.57 Deceased personalities
were defined as “all such persons who have died since 1948.”58
Finally, the Act created a right of action for damages against any
person who uses a person’s identity (whether a personality or not) without prior consent.59 The Act provided several exceptions for fair use,
such as satire, literary or musical works, and magazine articles.60 The
legislature passed the Act because, after several Washington cases involving the estate of Jimi Hendrix, the legislature determined that the
statute was lacking in its protections for postmortem publicity rights.
1. Litigation Involving the Estate of Jimi Hendrix
Jimi Hendrix died intestate in London in 1970.61 As Jimi had no
wife or children, Hendrix’s father, Al Hendrix, was the sole heir to his
51. Id. at 1313.
52. See Experience Hendrix, L.L.C. v. HendrixLicensing.com, Ltd., 766 F. Supp. 2d 1122,
1127 (W.D. Wash. 2011).
53. H.B. Rep. 2727, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008).
54. Id. at 1.
55. S.B. Rep. 2727, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 2.
60. Id.
61. HARRY SHAPIRO & CAESAR GLEBBEEK, JIMI HENDRIX, ELECTRIC GYPSY 8 (1990).
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estate.62 In 1995, Al Hendrix assigned his rights to the estate of Jimi
Hendrix to two limited liability companies, Experience Hendrix and Authentic Hendrix.63 In 2005, these assignees brought a right of publicity
claim against Electric Hendrix in federal district court in Washington
State.64 Judge Thomas Zilly dismissed the case, finding that, as Hendrix
was domiciled in New York at the time of his death, New York law must
apply to the case.65 New York law only recognizes the right of publicity
in living persons; thus, no right of publicity descended to Al Hendrix at
the time of Hendrix’s death.66 Because Al did not acquire Jimi Hendrix’s
publicity rights, he could not assign or transfer them to Experience Hendrix and Authentic Hendrix. In 2007, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision.67 The panel agreed that New York law (providing no posthumous
right of publicity) applied to the case and therefore affirmed the district
court’s grant of partial summary judgment.68
2. Amendments to the WPRA
After the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Electric Hendrix decision,69
Washington State Representative Pederson sponsored legislation seeking
to amend the publicity rights statute. The legislature introduced House
Bill 2727 in 2008 to strengthen the original Act passed ten years earlier.70
Representative Pederson sought to tighten up the law to protect deceased
personalities who died before 1998.71 Several other interested parties testified to the importance of ensuring that the right of publicity survived
postmortem.72 All were concerned with clarifying the existing personality rights law to protect people who had organized their interests based on
the existing law of personality rights.73 Discussions centered around the
fact that the bill was especially important in Washington State due to the

62. Experience Hendrix, L.L.C. v. HendrixLicensing.com, Ltd., 766 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1127
(W.D. Wash. 2011).
63. See Experience Hendrix, L.L.C. v. James Marshall Hendrix Found., No. C03-3462Z, 2005
WL 2922179, *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 4, 2005).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at *3.
67. Experience Hendrix, L.L.C. v. James Marshall Hendrix Found., 240 F. App’x 739 (9th Cir.
2007).
68. Id. at 740.
69. Id. at 739.
70. H.B. Rep. 2727, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess., at 2 (Wash. 2008).
71. Id. at 3.
72. S.B. Rep. 2727, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008). Two notable figures who testified
were Dave Green of Corbis and Karen Davis, an attorney who represented Experience Hendrix,
LLC.
73. Id. at 3.
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presence of Getty Images and Corbis, companies concerned with licensing rights of publicity.74
House Bill 2727 passed the House 94–0 and the Senate 46–0 and
was signed into law by Governor Gregoire on March 19, 2008.75 The
amended statute provided that in the State of Washington, the right of
publicity continues after a person’s death without regard to where the
person was domiciled when they died or whether the jurisdiction where
the person was domiciled recognized a similar right at the time of
death.76 The effect of the amended statute was to essentially create a national right of publicity claim for any plaintiff who was able to obtain
personal jurisdiction in the state of Washington.77

III. EXAMINATION OF THE DISTRICT COURT’S HOLDING
In a series of cases concerning the estate of Jimi Hendrix, the court
had determined that Jimi Hendrix was domiciled in New York when he
died.78 Under New York law, Hendrix’s right of publicity did not survive
at his death and was not passed to his father (his sole heir).79
After the 2008 changes to the WPRA, the statute essentially served
to allow the plaintiffs in the Experience Hendrix case to circumvent any
issues arising from Hendrix being domiciled in New York. However,
Judge Zilly objected to the amendments to the WPRA, finding them to
be unconstitutional for several reasons.
A. Background and Procedural Posture
Al Hendrix assigned various rights to Experience Hendrix, including the copyright for various songs and several federally registered
trademarks.80 After the Washington legislature amended the WPRA in
2008, Experience Hendrix brought action against HendrixLicensing.com,
alleging that defendants violated the Lanham Act,81 the Washington

74. Id. at 4.
75. 2008 House Bill 2727: Extending Personality Rights to a Deceased Person, WASH. VOTES,
http://www.washingtonvotes.org/2008-HB-2727 (last visited July 1, 2012).
76. H.B. Rep. 2727, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2008).
77. See Phillip Barengolts, Amending a Washington State Statute to Ignore Choice of Law
Principles Could Not Gain Jimi Hendrix’s Heirs a Post-Mortem Right of Publicity: Court Rules
Amendment Unconstitutional, PATISHALL IP BLOG (March 31, 2011), http://www.pattishall.com/
pdf/3-31-11-Jimi_Hendrix_ROP_Case_Blog_Post.pdf.
78. See supra Part II.B.1.
79. See supra Part II.B.1.
80. Experience Hendrix, L.L.C., v. HendrixLicensing.com, Ltd, 766 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1127
(W.D. Wash. 2011).
81. The Lanham Act is federal legislation that protects against trademark infringement, dilution, and false advertising. 15 U.S.C. § 1051.
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Consumer Protection Act, and state common law.82 Experience Hendrix
also sought to prevent HendrixLicensing.com from using song titles, lyrics, and renditions of Hendrix’s name.83
After instituting the action, Experience Hendrix sent a letter to the
defendant’s customers and issued a press release accusing the defendants
of trademark infringement.84 Experience Hendrix then sought a preliminary injunction, which was denied in part, as the court concluded that the
use of Hendrix’s name constituted fair use.85 The case came before the
United States District Court for the Western District of Washington on
the defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment.86 The defendants
additionally filed counterclaims, seeking a declaration that the 2008
amendments to the WPRA do not apply to Jimi Hendrix.87
Ultimately, the court granted partial summary judgment in favor of
the defendants as to their declaratory judgment counterclaim and declared that the defendants were not constrained by any right of publicity
from trading in images or likenesses of Jimi Hendrix. The court also declared that the use of the names “Hendrix” and “Jimi Hendrix” constituted fair use.88
Judge Zilly first addressed the issue of which state’s law to apply,
pointing out that the language of the WPRA requires courts to apply
Washington law without regard to the personality’s domicile at the time
of death.89 Under the WPRA, the court would be required to reach a different result with regard to Jimi Hendrix’s postmortem right of publicity
than the laws of New York would require.90 Thus, the court had to determine whether the requirements of the WPRA were subject to constitutional restrictions.91

82. Experience Hendrix, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1127−28.
83. Id. at 1128.
84. Id.
85. Id. “Fair use” is a First Amendment protection that encompasses uses of a person’s likeness
in connection with news or public affairs. See, e.g., MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 6:117.
86. Experience Hendrix, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1126.
87. Id. at 1129.
88. Id. at 1143.
89. Id. at 1132−33 (“Unlike the original WPRA, the 2008 amendments contain a clear directive
to apply the law of Washington. Indeed, the revised language appears to have been simply lifted
from a Ninth Circuit opinion that suggests how to phrase a choice-of-law provision. Because the
WPRA prescribes application of Washington law ‘regardless of place of domicile or place of domicile at time of death,’ RCW 63.60.010, the issue before the Court is whether such legislative directive is ‘subject to constitutional restrictions.’”).
90. Id. at 1132.
91. Id.
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B. Constitutionality of the WPRA
The court first took issue with the language in the Act referring to
the individual’s domicile:
The WPRA, as modified, does much more than impose liability for
the unauthorized use “of a living or deceased individual’s or personality’s name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness, on or in
goods, merchandise, or products entered into commerce in this
state.” The WPRA purports to govern whether a right of publicity
exists, whether it continues post-mortem, and how it may be transferred during life and after death, regardless of where the particular
individual or personality is or was domiciled. In addition, although
the WPRA requires that allegedly infringing goods, merchandise, or
products enter into commerce in Washington, it does not contain a
similar restriction concerning infringements occurring in the advertising of goods or services or in fund-raising or solicitation of donations. Rather, the statute defines infringement as unauthorized use in
advertising or fund-raising without regard to where such activities
transpire, and then separately precludes the dissemination or publication of such advertisements within the State of Washington.92

As such, the court stated that six specific provisions were unconstitutional: (1) the fourth sentence of RCW 63.60.010 (“regardless of
whether the law of the domicile, residence, or citizenship of the individual or personality at the time of death or otherwise recognizes a similar
or identical property right”);93 (2) the last sentence of RCW 63.60.010
(“regardless of place of domicile or place of domicile at time of
death”);94 (3) the language in RCW 63.60.020(1) (“regardless of the individual’s place of domicile, residence, or citizenship at the time of death
or otherwise”);95 (4) the stipulation in RCW 63.60.030(1)(a) (“regardless
of whether the law of the domicile of the deceased individual or personality, at the time of death, or thereafter, recognizes a similar or identical
property right”);96 (5) RCW 63.60.030(1)(b)(iv) (“regardless of whether
the law of the domicile of the deceased third party, at the time of death,
or thereafter, recognizes a similar or identical property right”);97 and (6)
RCW 63.60.020(2) (“regardless of the personality’s place of domicile,
residence, or citizenship at the time of death or otherwise”).98

92. Id. at 1135 (citation omitted).
93. Id. at 1141.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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1. Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clause Constitutionality
The court first stated that the Act was unconstitutional under the
Due Process and Full Faith and Credit Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.99
The court noted that when it comes to procedural matters, a state may
apply its own laws even when related substantive issues are governed by
laws of another state.100 But when deciding the merits of a claim, the
state must meet a “significant contact” standard.101 This means that the
choice of the forum state’s law rather than the domicile state’s law cannot be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.102
In this case, the defendants did not (and, as the court notes, could
not) show that Washington had sufficient interest in the defendants’
property rights to justify applying Washington law to the issue of postmortem publicity rights.103 Additionally, the court noted that “[n]ot only
is Washington’s choice-of-law directive at odds with the almost unanimous views of courts that have grappled with the survivability of the
right of publicity, it also runs contrary to the traditional approach for resolving the testamentary or intestate disposition of personal property.”104
2. Dormant Commerce Clause Constitutionality
The court also found that the Act was unconstitutional under the
dormant Commerce Clause.105 The court explained that the Commerce
Clause gives Congress the power to regulate commerce among the
states.106 Courts have interpreted the Commerce Clause to deny states the
same authority vested in Congress (this interpretation provides the
“dormant” aspect).107 Thus, states cannot apply their individual statutes
to commerce that takes place in other states.108

99. Id. at 1134−35.
100. Id. at 1135.
101. “[T]o satisfy constitutional requirements, the state ‘must have a significant contact or
significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither
arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.’” Id. (quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797,
818 (1985)).
102. Experience Hendrix, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1137.
103. “With respect to individuals or personalities domiciled in other jurisdictions, however,
Experience does not even attempt to argue that Washington has sufficient interests in their property
rights to justify application of Washington law to the issue whether such individuals’ or personalities’ rights of publicity survive their deaths.” Id. at 1135.
104. Id. at 1138.
105. Id. at 1141−42.
106. Id. at 1141.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1142.
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The court agreed with defendant’s characterization of the WPRA as
“creating a Washington-centered national right-of-publicity system.”109
The court saw the WPRA as an attempt by Washington to govern commercial transactions that have no connection at all with Washington, including “a variety of transactions occurring ‘wholly outside’ Washington’s borders, including right-of-publicity transfers between nonresidents via contract, testamentary device, or intestate succession, and
the creation and dissemination in other forums of advertising incorporating the names or likenesses of non-domiciliaries.”110 Furthermore, the
WPRA attempts to govern transfers between out-of-state citizens and to
control advertising in other areas that incorporates the names and likenesses of personalities with no connection to Washington.111
Accordingly, the court held that, as the WPRA seeks to govern
commercial transactions occurring outside Washington’s borders, the
choice-of-law directive in the WPRA violates the dormant Commerce
Clause.112 The court explicitly found the same provisions of the WPRA
that it determined were in violation of the Due Process and Full Faith and
Credit Clauses were additionally unconstitutional under the dormant
Commerce Clause.113
C. Policy Against Upholding the WPRA
The court also noted several policy reasons for striking down the
WPRA. First, it pointed out that the choice-of-law directive is in opposition to the traditional approach for dealing with personal property after
death.114 The court saw this as evidence of the arbitrariness of the WPRA
amendments.115
The court went on to explain that enforcing the provisions of the
WPRA will lead to inconsistent and unjust results.116 As only Washington and one other state (Indiana) have statutes that disregard the law of
the domicile, anyone using a deceased personality’s name or likeness
would be subject to contradictory standards.117 This would create a situation where defendants would be unable to avoid litigation in Washington,
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1143.
114. Id. at 1138; MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 11:17 (“The traditional rule, under both the First
and Second Restatement of Conflicts, for determining the testamentary or intestate disposition of
personal property is to look to the law of decedent’s domicile at the time of death.”).
115. Experience Hendrix, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1138.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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as it is not feasible to restrict sales to only states other than Washington.118
Furthermore, many plaintiffs would likely be motivated to specifically divert sales to Washington so that they can take advantage of the
protections of the WPRA.119 Finally, the court was concerned that, although defendants may do everything possible to avoid having any conduct in Washington, they would still be subject to the WPRA because
specific jurisdiction may be based solely on the effects within the forum
state.120
The court concluded its policy discussion by emphasizing the importance of the law of domicile to avoid the negative consequences with
which the court was concerned.121 The court explained that, as a personality can have only one domicile at the time of death, the law of domicile
is “a constant, based upon which the scope and survivability of any right
of publicity may be derived.”122 This means that any person using the
image or likeness of a personality that has passed into the public domain
does not need to worry about restricting its sales to certain states.123 This
would also eliminate the incentive for plaintiffs to divert sales to a specific state to obtain jurisdiction there (“forum shopping”).124

IV. A PROPOSAL TO PRESERVE PERSONALITY RIGHTS AFTER
DEATH IN WASHINGTON STATE
The district court correctly concluded that the Washington Personality Rights Act, when applied, violates the Due Process, Full Faith and
Credit, and dormant Commerce Clauses. Although the Act as it stands
today is invalid, it is still important for the right of publicity to be descendible for the protection of celebrities and their families.
In light of the importance of a descendible right of publicity, this
Part puts forth the argument that, to avoid the constitutional issues addressed in Experience Hendrix, the Washington State Legislature should
make further amendments to the statute. Washington publicity rights
laws should provide sufficient postmortem protections of publicity rights
while avoiding the constitutional issues that arose in the Experience
Hendrix case.

118. Id. at 1138−39.
119. Id. at 1139.
120. Id. (quoting Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 789−91 (1984)).
121. Experience Hendrix, 766 F. Supp. 2d at 1139−40.
122. Id. at 1139.
123. Id. at 1140.
124. Id.
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A. The District Court Was Correct in Its Constitutionality Analysis
In its holding in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., the
Supreme Court made clear that state-created publicity rights are not per
se unconstitutional.125 But unlike Zacchini, many modern right of publicity cases center on the use of a celebrity’s likeness in interstate commerce.126 As such, far-reaching statutes like the WPRA, while not per se
unconstitutional, often violate the Due Process and Commerce Clauses of
the Constitution.
As Experience Hendrix involved the use of Jimi Hendrix’s likeness
in interstate commerce (a Nevada-based corporation selling Hendrix
memorabilia in stores owned by a New Jersey-based company with locations throughout the United States), the application of the WPRA to the
case necessarily elicits constitutional questions. The district court was
correct in concluding that the WPRA violates the Due Process and
Commerce Clauses, rendering the 2008 WPRA amendments unworkable.
1. Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that
[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.127

Although civil defendants are not afforded the same strict due process
protections as criminal defendants, “the basic protection against ‘judgments without notice’ afforded by the Due Process Clause is implicated
by civil penalties.”128
The district court correctly concluded that the amended WPRA violates the Due Process Clause. As noted by Judge Kozinski in his dissent
in White v. Samsung Electronics, “[t]he broader and more ill-defined one
state’s right of publicity, the more it interferes with the legitimate inter-

125. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 578−79 (1977) (“We conclude that
although the State of Ohio may as a matter of its own law privilege the press in the circumstances of
this case, the First and Fourteenth Amendments do not require it to do so.”).
126. See generally Jeremy T. Marr, Note, Constitutional Restraints on State Right of Publicity
Laws, 44 B.C. L. REV. 863 (2003).
127. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
128. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 n.22 (1996) (citation omitted) (quoting
Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 217 (1977)).
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ests of other states.”129 This interference with the interests of other states
constitutes a violation of the Due Process Clause.
First, application of the WPRA leads to uncertainty for any business that wishes to use the likeness of a celebrity in commerce. Although
the use may be acceptable under the laws of the state in which the business is domiciled, the business may still be subject to punishment in the
State of Washington. Any such business or individual would not be on
notice as to which law applies to them, or how they can ensure compliance with the laws. When a business or individual engages in acts that
are lawful in one state but is then subject to damages in another state,
there arise concerns about the fair notice requirements of the Due Process Clause.130 The WPRA thus violates the “[e]lementary notions of
fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictat[ing] that a
person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to
punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.”131
Furthermore, the WPRA’s stipulation that Washington publicity
rights law applies regardless of domicile violates the Due Process
Clause. The WPRA makes an outright statement that Washington will
apply its law without taking into account the interest of any other state,
the appropriateness of applying the laws of another state, or the interests
of the citizens of other states. This extension of Washington’s reach beyond constitutional limitations violates due process limitations by
“mak[ing] otherwise lawful conduct unlawful.”132
2. Full Faith and Credit
Article IV of the Constitution provides that “full faith and credit
shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state.”133 To determine whether a state’s law violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause, courts examine “the contacts of
the State, whose law was applied, with the parties and with the occurrence or transaction giving rise to the litigation.”134 If the court determines that the state seeking to apply its law “has only an insignificant

129. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1519 (1993) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
130. See Hillel Michael Elkins, Note, Take My Likeness, Please: Threats to the Right of Publicity in Light of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell, 78 S. CAL. L. REV.
1371, 1393 (2005).
131. BMW of N. Am., 517 U.S. at 574.
132. Elkins, supra note 130, at 1383.
133. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
134. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 (1981).
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contact with the parties and the occurrence or transaction, application of
its law is unconstitutional.”135
In the instant case, the State of Washington had only limited contact
with the parties and the occurrence or transaction. The plaintiff was domiciled in Washington, while the defendant was domiciled in Nevada. The
transaction or occurrence (the sale of Jimi Hendrix-related materials) was
initiated by a company with its principle place of business in New Jersey.
Although Jimi Hendrix was born in Washington State, this was not a significant contact because he no longer lived in Washington at the time of
his death (and for several years prior). Thus, the only contact with the
State of Washington was the plaintiff’s residence. As applying Washington’s law to a case with so few significant contacts with the state violated
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the court was correct in determining
that the WPRA could not be applied without violating important constitutional limitations.
Similar problems will arise in any other case to which the current
version of the WPRA is applied. Anytime a significant state contact such
as the location of the decedent’s domicile is ignored by stipulation of
state law, this will result in applying the law of the state with fewer connections to the case. Giving more weight to the law of a state where the
celebrity was not domiciled at the time of death therefore results in a violation of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
3. Dormant Commerce Clause
The Tenth Amendment provides that “[t]he powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states,
are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”136 This amendment, coupled with the Commerce Clause’s grant of power to Congress
“to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
states, and with the Indian tribes,”137 implies that there is a prohibition
against individual states creating statutes that burden interstate commerce
or discriminate against other states. This prohibition is known as the
dormant Commerce Clause.
The district court was correct in its conclusion that the “regardless
of domicile” provisions of the WPRA violate the dormant Commerce
Clause. The Supreme Court has long recognized that a statute has the
potential to violate the dormant Commerce Clause if it places a substantial burden on interstate commerce when applied to activities that take

135. Id. at 311.
136. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
137. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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place across state lines.138 Other federal courts have repeatedly struck
down state statutes that, when applied, resulted in a Commerce Clause
violation.139 It therefore stands to reason that a state publicity rights statute that similarly burdens interstate commerce would be invalid.140
The amended WPRA falls into this category. The statute explicitly
states that its provisions universally apply “regardless of whether the law
of the domicile, residence, or citizenship of the individual or personality
at the time of death or otherwise recognizes a similar or identical property right.”141 This stipulation that Washington’s publicity rights law
should apply to essentially any situation in which there is an accusation
of infringement of a deceased individual’s rights places an undue burden
on interstate commerce.
First, the amendments to the WPRA created a state law that prevents individuals and businesses in other states from engaging in commercial activities that are lawful in their home states. Statutes having this
effect have been recognized as violating the Commerce Clause by “diminish[ing] . . . entitlement to fair notice of the demands that the several
States impose on the conduct of . . . business.”142
Second, the broad scope of the WPRA has in effect created a national standard to which advertisers must adhere. Especially with the
widespread use of Internet advertising, advertisers are forced to either
create multiple marketing campaigns for different states, or conform to
the requirements of the WPRA.143 As there is extra expense incurred in
creating multiple campaigns,144 advertisers are essentially forced to use
the WPRA as their guideline for any advertisements used nationwide.
This broad application impermissibly restricts interstate commerce.

138. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 529−30 (1959) (“A State
which insists on a design out of line with the requirements of almost all the other States may sometimes place a great burden of delay and inconvenience on those . . . entering . . . its territory.”).
139. See, e.g., Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Meyer, 63 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding
that requirement that out-of-state communities adopt Wisconsin’s recycling program regulated conduct wholly outside Wisconsin and was thus invalid); In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., 755 F.
Supp. 2d 857, 887−88 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (holding that Ohio Securities Act that applied to transactions outside Ohio violated the Commerce Clause); Connecticut v. Cahill, 180 F. Supp. 2d 392, 400
(N.D.N.Y. 2001) (holding that New York regulation denying access to lobstering waters unless
applicants surrendered their rights to access waters of any other state violated Commerce Clause).
140. See, e.g., Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1288 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting) (“Just as a state law regulating the length of trucks is invalid under the dormant Commerce Clause if it poses an undue burden on interstate commerce . . . so California’s right of publicity law is invalid . . . .”).
141. WASH . R EV . C ODE § 63.60.010 (2008).
142. BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 585 (1996).
143. Marr, supra note 126, at 891.
144. Id.
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Modern Commerce Clause jurisprudence recognizes that state laws
like the WPRA “violate two [] principles of commerce clause jurisprudence: (1) that states cannot directly regulate interstate commerce; and
(2) that incidental regulations of interstate commerce cannot be excessive
in light of local interests furthered by the law.”145 As the WPRA violates
both of these principles, the district court’s conclusion that the WPRA is
in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause is in keeping with current
jurisprudence and was thus accurate.
B. Justifications for a Descendible Right of Publicity
There are many reasons why it is important for the right of publicity
to be descendible. The Eleventh Circuit articulated the first of these reasons: “if the right of publicity dies with the celebrity, the economic value
of the right of publicity during life would be diminished because the celebrity’s untimely death would seriously impair, if not destroy, the value
of the right of continued commercial use.”146
Other courts have put forth several other important reasons. For example, the Tennessee Court of Appeals stated that a descendible right of
publicity promotes an individual’s right to have his or her assets distributed as specified in a will while protecting the celebrity’s right to pass on
the value of the personality he or she has created to his or her heirs and
assigns after death.147
The Tennessee Court of Appeals went on to explain that allowing
publicity rights to descend to a celebrity’s heirs prevents the unjust enrichment of third parties and protects the rights of any licensees who
have contracted with the celebrity.148 Additionally, as a matter of policy,
descendible publicity rights further the public interest in counting on the
truth of representations regarding celebrity sponsorship of goods, as
“[f]alsely claiming that a living celebrity endorses a product or service
145. Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 601 F. Supp. 381, 383 (1985) (citing Edgar v. MITE
Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982)).
146. See Lapter, supra note 40, at 271 (citing Martin Luther King Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change v.
Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 694 F.2d 674, 682−86 (11th Cir. 1983)).
147. State ex rel. Elvis Presley Int’l Mem’l Found. v. Cromwell, 733 S.W.2d 89, 97−98 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1987) (“We have also concluded that recognizing that the right of publicity is descendible
promotes several important policies that are deeply ingrained in Tennessee’s jurisprudence. First, it
is consistent with our recognition that an individual’s right of testamentary distribution is an essential right. If a celebrity’s right of publicity is treated as an intangible property right in life, it is no
less a property right at death.”).
148. Id. at 98−99 (“[C]oncluding that the right of publicity is descendible recognizes the value
of the contract rights of persons who have acquired the right to use a celebrity’s name and likeness.
The value of this interest stems from its duration and its exclusivity. If a celebrity’s name and likeness were to enter the public domain at death, the value of any existing contract made while the
celebrity was alive would be greatly diminished.”).
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violates [Tennessee State Law]. It should likewise be discouraged after a
celebrity has died.”149
As it is clearly important to ensure that the right of publicity is descendible, the Washington State Legislature should consider new changes to the WPRA, taking into account the constitutional limitations on the
current law and narrowing the scope of the WPRA to avoid those limitations.
C. Proposal for Legislative Changes
In recent years, many scholars have advocated for a federal right of
publicity law, citing the need for uniformity across the states. As stated
by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, “[t]he state of the law is still that
of a haystack in a hurricane.”150 Adopting a federal right of publicity law
would address many of the issues with inconsistent state laws and the
difficulty in determining which law to apply and how to apply it. Advocates hope that “federal legislative action [would] correct the shortcomings of the current scheme, effectively protecting individuals’ property
rights while simultaneously placing the proper incentives on potential
plaintiffs and defendants.”151
A federal law would also help to rectify the constitutional concerns
addressed by the district court in the Experience Hendrix case. However,
lawmakers have been reluctant to step in and create legislation that
would clear up any confusion in the different right of publicity laws
among the states.
In light of the continuing lack of a federal law, the Washington
State Legislature should amend the WPRA to protect a celebrity’s right
of publicity after the celebrity’s death while staying in line with the limitations of the Constitution. The legislature could narrow the scope of the
WPRA by requiring a nexus between the commercial use of a celebrity’s
likeness and the State of Washington. This would allow the heirs of a
deceased celebrity to enforce their rights while assuaging Due Process,
Full Faith and Credit, and dormant Commerce Clause concerns.
Under choice of law principles, the forum state (here, Washington)
must have a reasonable basis for applying its own law to a case.152 The
state has a reasonable basis for applying its law only if (1) an event (such
149. Id. at 99.
150. Ettore v. Philco Television Broad. Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (1956).
151. Blair Joseph Cash, Note, “Hasta La Vista Funny Guys”: Arnold Schwarzenegger’s Fictional Voice Misappropriation Lawsuit Against Comedians Imitating His Voice and the Case for a
Federal Right of Publicity Statute, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 207, 229 (2010).
152. James A. Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 185,
194 (1976).
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as creating a contract or completing a transaction) closely connected with
the cause of action has taken place in the forum state; and (2) applying
the state’s law would not be unfair to the party opposing the application
of the law.153 Additionally, the issue must arise from conduct from which
the opposing party did or could have received some material benefit; or if
there was no material benefit, it must have been foreseeable that the party might be subject to the laws of the forum state.154 Applying this threepart test will satisfy Due Process, Full Faith and Credit, and dormant
Commerce Clause concerns, which all require some form of significant
state contacts and fairness to survive a constitutional challenge.155
The first part of the test for whether the state has a reasonable basis
for applying its law creates a nexus requirement. This requirement ensures that the state seeking to apply its own law has sufficient contacts
with the cause or action to justify the application of its own rules.156 Similarly, dormant Commerce Clause doctrine employs a nexus requirement.157 Applied mostly in the area of taxation, there is a requirement of
“some definite link, some minimum connection . . . between a taxing
state and the person, property, or transaction that the state seeks to
tax.”158 This limits the authority of the states and prevents states from
creating regulations that encroach upon Congress’s power to regulate
interstate commerce.159
Similarly, incorporating nexus requirements into the WPRA could
allow the statute to serve its intended purpose of protecting the rights of
deceased celebrities while avoiding the constitutional problems that concerned the court in the Experience Hendrix case. The Washington State
Legislature could redraft the statute to require that the defendant’s commercial use of the celebrity’s likeness has sufficient contacts (a “nexus”)
with Washington State. Sufficient contacts could encompass things like
advertising in Washington using the celebrity’s likeness, deriving monetary benefit in Washington from the use of the likeness, and engaging in
activities in Washington from which the defendant expects to receive a
monetary benefit.
Under existing dormant Commerce Clause cases, it is fairly easy to
establish a connection with the forum state for the purposes of fulfilling a

153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See supra Part IV.A.
156. Martin, supra note 152.
157. 14A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 6934 (rev. vol. 2012).
158. Id.
159. Kirk J. Stark, The Federal Role in State Tax Reform, 30 VA. TAX REV. 407, 429 (2010).
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nexus requirement.160 Courts have found that many types of activities
create such a nexus, including occasionally visiting the state, having an
employee in the state, storing items in the state, and carrying on business
partially within (in addition to outside) the state.161 Specifically, Washington courts have found that a nexus existed with the State of Washington, even when a company had no permanent offices or employees in
Washington, because the company sent sales representatives to meet with
Washington customers, a “practice . . . significantly associated with its
ability to establish and maintain its Washington market.”162
It would be fairly easy for a Washington plaintiff to establish that a
defendant’s commercial activities using the likeness of a deceased celebrity had a nexus with the state. Once the nexus requirement is placed in
the WPRA, a plaintiff could easily show that a defendant had advertised
in Washington, sent products or materials to Washington, established
some sort of market in Washington, or derived some monetary benefit
from Washington citizens.
For example, in the case at hand, the defendant,
HendrixLicensing.com “distribute[d] or [sought] to distribute posters,
fine art prints, apparel, and other novelty items bearing the likeness of, or
art created by, Jimi Hendrix, accompanied with his name.”163 The company was located in Las Vegas, Nevada; however, the defendant’s customers offered the items for sale at stores in Washington State, including
Spencer’s Gifts.164 Under a nexus requirement, a court could easily conclude that the defendant derived monetary benefit from selling items
bearing Hendrix’s likeness in Washington, sent its products to Washington, carried on business in Washington, and acted in ways intended to
establish or maintain a market for Jimi Hendrix merchandise in Washington. Thus, under a modified version of the WPRA, Experience Hendrix
would have been able to recover for damages. At the same time, the
WPRA would not violate the Due Process, Full Faith and Credit, and
dormant Commerce Clauses of the Constitution.

160. 14A FLETCHER, supra note 157, § 6934.
161. See, e.g., Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Businesses: Perspective on Two
Centuries of Constitutional Adjudication, 41 TAX LAW 37, 56−57 (1987); see also Standard Pressed
Steel Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560 (1975); United Airlines v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623 (1973);
Orvis Co., Inc. v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 86 N.Y.2d 165 (1995).
162. Lamtec Corp. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 246 P.3d 788 (Wash. 2011).
163. Experience Hendrix, L.L.C. v. HendrixLicensing.com, Ltd., 766 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1128
(W.D. Wash. 2011).
164. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
The right to personality and publicity has changed in many ways
over the years. It is handled differently across the country, with some
states having stronger protections than others. Until recently, Washington
State had some of the strongest personality rights protections for deceased celebrities. But the decision of the district court in Experience
Hendrix, L.L.C. v. HendrixLicensing.com, Ltd. effectively eliminated
some of these protections.
The district court correctly concluded that the WPRA as amended
in 2008 violates the Due Process, Full Faith and Credit, and dormant
Commerce Clauses. The stipulation that Washington’s publicity rights
law applies “regardless of domicile” violates the Due Process Clause in
that it leads to uncertainty as to which state law will apply and fails to
take into account the interests of any other state. Additionally, the
WPRA violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause by ignoring the significant contacts parties may have with others states, which would then
make the other state’s law more applicable. Finally, the WPRA violates
the dormant Commerce Clause by overburdening commerce that takes
place across state lines.
As celebrities are largely dependent on the moneymaking capabilities of the use of their likenesses, the State of Washington has a strong
interest in protecting the rights of celebrities and individuals, both during
life and after death. In light of the absence of a federal law addressing the
right of publicity, the legislature is left with the option of amending the
current WPRA.
To ensure that personality rights continue after death, the Washington legislature should amend the Washington Personality Rights Act. The
Act can be amended to protect personality rights after death while remaining within constitutional boundaries. To do so, the legislature could
alter the WPRA to require a significant nexus between the commercial
use of the celebrity’s likeness and the State of Washington, implicating
issues of fairness. This would narrow the scope of the law to ensure that
the Act does not violate the Due Process, Full Faith and Credit, and
dormant Commerce Clauses while still allowing heirs to retain a celebrity’s right to publicity after they have passed away.

